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Banks and Foreign Exchange Markets
contrasts with a "spot" contract in which a
buyer receives the currency two days later.
The rate at which the currencies are ex-
changed, the forward or spot rate, is deter-
mined at the time the parties enter into the
contract. In Franklin's case the currencies
were worth less than their purchase price
when the forward contracts matured.
Federal officials declared Franklin insolvent
on October 8, 1974. While details ofthe
Franklin story were still unfolding, the
Bundesbank, West Germany's central bank,
announcedthe liquidationofoneofits most
active trading banks, Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt
KG. The reason given for closing the bank
was heavy foreign exchange trading losses,
although the precise nature ofthe trans-
actions was not revealed. In the same year,
Wesdeutsche Landesbank Gironzentral of
West Germany and Union Bank ofSwitzer-
land both sustained "hefty" losses related to
foreign exchange.
Policy responses
The immediateofficial response varied. In
1974, German bank regulators moved to
limit banks' net open positions-thediffer-
ence between bank foreign currency assets
and liabilities-totwenty percent ofbank
capital. The United States considered
similar regulation while strengthening its
supervisory efforts. The FDIC, forexample,
revised questionnaires for its examiners' use
in investigating foreign exchange trading
operations, and the Federal Financiallnsti-
tution Examination Council (FFIEC) pub-
lished guidelines for the conduct oftrading
operations. One guideline recommended
that banks set their own c1ose-of-day
position limits.
Earlier, in response to the dollardevalua-
tion in 1973,the U.S. Treasury had begun to
collect weekly data on the c1ose-of-day
foreign currency net positions ofthe most
activetrading banks in this country. In 1975,
The bank's losses were apparently caused
by forward transactions. In aforward con-
tract, the buyer agrees to purchase aspeci-
fied amountofcurrency on a specified date,
usually several months in the future. This
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These concerns have prompted a number of
studies byeconomists. Early studies, doneat
the Federal Reserve Board, focused on the
priorities ofregulatory agencies and com-
mittees. More recently, economists have
been freed from the constraints ofcon-
gressionally mandated studies and with
increased institutional knowledge about the
workings offoreign exchange markets, have
begun to focus on different issues. The vari-
ous studies ofbank participation in foreign
exchange markets will be examined here.
In 1974, losses from foreign exchange
trading led to the insolvency oftwo banks-
Franklin National in the United States and
Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt in West Germany.
Several years later, between the summer of
1977 and Novemberof 1978, the dollar fell
in value against the German mark, the
Japanese yen and the Swiss franc.
These seemingly unrelated events crystal-
Iize the concerns ofpolicymakers about
commercial bank foreign exchange trading.
One concern has been that such trading
involvesundueriskthatmight be asource of
bank insolvency. A second has been that
banks engaging in foreign exchange trading
for speculative purposes may influence
exchange rates.
Causes for concern
The initial concern about commercial bank
foreign exchangetrading was sparked bythe
problemsoffourbankinginstitutionsaround
the world. In early Mayof 1974, Franklin
National, then the twentieth largest bank in
this country in terms ofassets, announced
that it had lost $12 million because ofunau-
thorized foreign exchange trading.nec(,-:"c.,,\(i;\' n~rie(l frH.' viev\''-, or thv marElgc'!'flerrt
qi :ht~ ;:'(:"Ck'(d! t{(,,':,;,':"(vk-' Hili":k or '),)i''l hdfH, :'1('(;
ill' Of the' Board (;1 C;o\,('t'nors of \+w' r('c!,er,:;i
RC'SZ'i'\-,C SV';'If'rn
it began to publish this data monthly in the
Treasury Bulletin. The dollar depreciation
between 1977 and 1978brought renewed
interest in official circles about the influ-
ence ofbank foreign exchange trading
on exchange rates. The Senate committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
conducted inquiries into the operation of
foreign exchange markets in both 1978 and
1979. Senator Proxmire voiced the Com-
mittee's primary concern:
"There have been accusations made...
Some banks are so huge that a few
working together perhaps could push
the rates in achosen direction...we
owe the public as well as the banks...a
thorough and careful inquiry•..." .
The studies prompted by the policymakers'
concerns over potential bank insolvency
and the influence ofbanks on exchange
rates were conducted at the Board ofGov-
ernors ofthe Federal Reserve System.
Federal Reserve Board studies
Robert Bradshaw's study, "Foreign
Exchange Operations of U.s. Banks," was
undertaken because regulatory reforms that
"might be implemented to limit bank's
exposure to foreign exchange losses" were
being considered. Bradshaw was primarily
trying to determine whether net open posi-
tions were so large that the associated ex-
change rate risk threatened bank solvency.
Whenever an open position or exposure
exists, exchange rate fluctuations will
change its value and cause a profitor loss.
Bradshaw attempted to measure "netopen
position exposure" by using the limits 35
banks had imposed on theirown net open
positions. He totalled the limits in several
currencies and calculated the ratio ofthis
total to bank equity capital. Bradshaw found
this ratio to be "in the 10 to 20 percent
range" for most major money center banks.
Heobserved thatabank rarely Uses its limits
in all currencies simultaneously and that a
bank is notlikelyto suffer a 100percent loss
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on its open position when exchange rates
move counter to expectations. Bradshaw
concluded that net open exposure in prac-
tice is likelyto be amuch smallerpercentage
ofcapital than the 10 to 20 percent figure
mentioned above. The small size ofnetposi-
tions relative to equity capital also led
Bradshaw to the conclusion that net open
exposure would be an unlikely source of
future bank insolvency.
In their 1980 study, "U.S. Banks, Exchange
Markets, and the Dollar, Sept.-Nov. 1978,"
Board Economists Ralph Smith, Jr. and
Barbara Lowrey examined data collected in
a survey ofbank foreign exchange trading
and position taking activity: "The Survt'W
was requested in hopes ofshedding addi""·
tionallight on allegations that the specula-
tive activities of large trading banks were
responsible forthe severe sellingpressureon
the dollar in October 1978." They found'
"no indication that changes in U.S. banks'
positions 'drove' exchange rates in one way
or the other" during the period.
Lowrey and Smith attributed the lack ofa
statistically significant influence ofbank
changes in positions on exchange rates to
the small size ofvariations in bank's posi-
tions "relative to the variation in other
market participants' positions."
New York Fed studies
In 1977, and again in 1980 and 1983, the
Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York con-
ducted surveys offoreign exchange market
turnover that have provided information
about the magnitude ofthe market and
about different types ofmarket transactions.
In the New York Fed's Autumn 1981 Quar-
ter/y Review, Patricia Revey made extensive
use ofthe turnover surveys in an article
entitled "Evolution and Growth ofthe U.S.
Foreign Exchange Market." In 1978, a mon-
;ograph by Roger Kubarych entitled Foreign
Exchange Markets in the United States tried
to explain how the market works and how
banks operate in it.Both studies discussed the natureofbank net
positions by examining the extent to which
they are deliberately assumed. It is clearthat
banks must take positions to serve their
customers. For example, ifa customer sells
OM, the bank becomes a buyer and has a
positiveor"long" netposition. A bankwish-
ingto avoid as much risk as possible can
have its traders enterthe market "onlywhen
they have commercial orders tocover," that
is, the bank can follow a "sequential
approach." In this example, the bankwould
"cover" the position created by the cus-
tomerdeal by going into the markettosell
the same amountofOM it had purchased.
Kubarych observes that it is virtually impos-
sible for an active bank to take a "sequen-
tial" approach. Similarly, Revey argues
that the $38S billion increase in foreign
exchange turnover between the 1977 and
1980 surveys cannot be attributed solely
to attempts by banks to cover an increased
amount ofcustomer transactions. She esti-
mates that halfof the increase was due to
banks that entered into transactions in the
hopes ofprofiting from exchange or interest
rate movements. Herfinding suggests that
asignificant amountofforeign exchange
activity is due to banks thatdeliberatelytake
a net open position.
Revey and Kubarych agree that banks do
more than merely respond to the open posi-
tion thrust upon them by customer service.
They contend that banks have desired net
open positions based on anticipated rate
movements and that they use the markett9
reconcile their desired positions with the
ones dictated by customer transactions.
Revey also suggests that commercial bank
positions may play the role ofinventories in
the market. In her view, the willingness of
banks to hold net open positions may influ-
ence exchange rate variability: when bank
holdings offoreign exchange adjust to
accommodate excesses ofsupply and
demand in the foreign exchange market,
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they may diminish the need for exchange
rate adjustments to correct the imbalance.
Conclusion
The initial studies on commercial bank
participation in foreign exchange markets
necessarily focused on the size ofbank net
positions and the potential ofbanks for
influencing exchange rates. Although these
studies concluded that U.S. bank positions
were not likelyto cause insolvency or to
influence exchange rates, it would be a
mistake to infer that bank participation does
not affect the operation offoreign exchange
markets. Revey's work suggests that the
potential bank influence on exchange rate
variabilitymustalsobe considered. Stanford
University Professor Ronald McKinnon has
argued that a lack ofcommercial bank
position-taking can actually be asource
of instability in the foreign exchanges.
The feverish concern about foreign ex-
change trading caused by the bank failures
and exchange market turmoil ofthe seven-
ties has subsided, butthe subject is still
of more than academic interest. All major
central banks want to keep track ofand,
at times, influence exchange market condi-
tions. For this reason, they need to under-
stand how the market operates. Perceptions
of the effects ofbank exchange trading also
are likely to influence the policies ofregu-
latory authorities in the future. For example,
as recently as March of 1983, the Australian
central bank ordered its commercial banks
to stop all trading notdirectly related to
customer orders. Traders have asked for a
reconsideration ofthis directive. How the
Australian central bank, forone, views the
role ofthe banks in the foreign exchange
markets is sure to influence its ultimate
decision.
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Selected Assets and Liabilities
Large Commercial Banks
BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
716183 6129183 Dollar Percent
loans (gross, adjusted) and investments" 163,112 - 24 1.912 1.2
loans (gross, adjusted) - totaJ# 141.676 29 1,294 0.9
Commercial and industrial 44.262 - 76 102 0.2
Real estate 56,063 - 170 - 1,273 - 2.2
Loans to individuals 23,919 - 19 581 2.5
Securities loans 2.612 8 428 19.6
U.S. Treasury securities" 8,375 109 1,778 27.0
Othersecurities* 13,060 - 161 - 1.161 - 8.2
Demand deposits - total# 45,985 4,598 3,705 8.8
Demanddeposits - adjusted 29,901 1,344 1,821 6.5
Savings deposits - totalt 67,268 1,089 36,002 115.1
Time deposits.-total# 65,298 - 426 - 31,198 - 32.3
Individuals, part. & corp. 59,589 - 111 - 27,557 - 31.6
(La"e neQotiable CD's) 19 147 229 16572 46.4
Weekly Averages
ofDailv Fiuures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Res€lVes (+)/Deficiency (-)
Borrowings
Net (ree reserves (+l/Net borrowed{-)
Weekended Weekended Comparable
71 61 83 61 291 83 \learMa':'o ru:>riod
14) 108 97
807 812 50
- 666 - 705 46
* Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
t Includes Money Market Deposit Accounts, Super"NOW accounts, and NOW accounts.
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